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Abstract  
Offshore outsourcing has facilitated exchange of knowledge and services with clients and suppliers situated in 
diverse economic markets. To better manage knowledge exchange and mitigate risks from international 
partnerships, client and suppliers use various elements of relational governance practice. This study investigates 
three cases engaged in supplier-client relationships, to examine how the operational and social aspects of the 
knowledge exchange are governed. Findings reveal that offshore partnerships are first constituted with service 
level agreements, which set control measures and layout business expectations from both partners. Boundary 
gate keepers bring further accountability across firms by designing social networks for capturing and sharing of 
knowledge, thereby reducing each partner’s perception of risk. The study contributes to existing studies on 
offshore knowledge markets and explains how relational governance practices operate in a global socio-
technical setting.  In doing so, the study demonstrates how knowledge processes, social networks and market 
economies influence relational elements for supporting the exchange. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The outsourcing industry has bridged mature and emerging economies with use of ICT tools to facilitate the flow 
of knowledge across businesses situated in these locations. The current expansion in knowledge markets has 
blurred the earlier social, technical, cultural and organisational boundaries, as businesses in rich economies 
engage in purchase of expertise and skills from emerging economies. To sustain their business growth in the 
current tough cost cutting financial times, many organisations are engaged in outsourcing partnerships with firms 
situated in low cost countries. However, business relationships between offshore partners are not devoid of risk 
and uncertainty. How are mutual expectations laid across outsourcing arrangements amongst members having 
different organisational allegiance in dissimilar cultural settings? Misunderstanding and miscommunication in 
relationships can occur due to different social interpretations or due to transaction costs associated with economic 
exchange (e.g., bargaining costs, enforcement costs, travel costs) (Gefen and Carmel 2008). This raises questions 
on the subject of viability of offshore practices in maintaining ongoing business relationships. Outsourcing 
research in terms of governance structures, contracting, outsourcing arrangements and relationship studies are still 
very much work-in-progress, despite the growth in offshore knowledge and service markets (Willcocks 2011). 
The field of business relationship in IT outsourcing has been drawn from a wide range of governance perspectives 
based on market economics, knowledge competencies and social networks.  Recent studies on governance 
orientation in outsourcing relationships have assessed business associations to contain elements of all three types 
of governance modes (Goo and Huang 2008; Qi and Chau 2012). Businesses strategize in real world 
environments based on market cost reasoning, while at the same time they leverage on knowledge-based learning. 
And, the learning is further enhanced by ongoing social mechanisms during the course of engagement. This 
intermediary mode, namely relational governance (RG) is established by joint planning and strategizing by both 
partners at the outset of the relationship (Claro et al. 2003). Business partners, including suppliers and clients, 
engage in outsourcing collaborations after weighing both risks and benefits in creating and sustaining strategic 
value, by building institutional trust through contractual agreements and social relationships (Goo and Huang 
2008). 
Prior literature has stated reluctance of offshore partners to engage in business with firms which are located in 
culturally distant countries, and prefer to maintain business relations in similar cultural territories (Gefen and 
Carmel 2008; Rothaermal et al. 2006). Knowledge firms consequently work on relationship governance 
mechanisms to foster trust, build shared social contexts and remove exclusiveness of cultures (Schroeder et al. 
2012). This often involves role of boundary gate keepers or agents in the partner firms who discuss shared 
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behaviours and expectations with their counterparts, and filter down agreements to members within their own 
business groups.  
While many perspectives in understanding of business relationships exist, we have used a contextualised view of 
a particular empirical setting comprising three case studies. Of the three cases, two are New Zealand (NZ) owned 
organisations based in Auckland who had outsourced IT work offshore to the third case, a supplier in Vizag, 
India. In this paper, we draw upon experiences of the boundary gate keepers from the three cases, to understand 
how RG mechanisms are implemented across two dissimilar organisational and cultural environments. Using 
descriptive case studies, we examine the relational governance strategies deployed by clients and suppliers to 
manage knowledge exchange and reduce perceptions of outsourcing risk. This is an interesting empirical setting 
because it presents a situation of how a successful relational governance mode led to the eventual termination of 
the relationship. Both New Zealand clients were so enamoured with the success of their previous outsourcing 
relationship, that they discontinued the current outsourcing partnership, identified new offshore partners (IT 
suppliers), and opened separate joint venture businesses with the new supplier firms in India. Both client firms 
began the conduct of IT business themselves as they decided to backward integrate with offshore suppliers. 
Backward integration is done by buyer firms (clients) to internalise external effects of independent sellers 
(suppliers) by entering into ownership partnerships with suppliers to gain more market power, reduce uncertainty 
of supply, maximise cost benefits, or to create more learning and innovation capabilities (Laussel 2008; Leavy 
2002). Evidence from the three cases explains how a successful relational governance strategy resulted in closure 
of business for one case (Indian supplier) and start of two new joint venture collaborations via backward 
integration in offshore markets for the other two NZ client firms. This empirical study shares new insights in 
relational governance practices associated with offshore markets. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, we review literature on relational governance and its 
relationship to traditional exchange theories. The next section discusses how contractual obligations are laid out 
in outsourcing arrangements with service level agreements (SLAs) to set clear standards of control measures and 
business expectations from both parties. The roles of boundary agents (or gate keepers) are explained next. We 
then present the research design used in the study, followed by descriptions of the three case studies. The case 
findings are discussed next. Finally, the paper concludes with contributions, limitations and proposed future 
directions. 
RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Exchange theories are traditionally driven by transaction models grounded between two polar extremes, namely 
market trades and social networks (Claro et al. 2003). The market trading view is concerned with the economic 
interpretations which involve cost of producing a service versus buying the service; while social networks view 
underlines the behavioural rationale between supplier and client, which is built upon shared notions of trust and 
social values (Mol 2007). In between this broad spectrum of governance starting from an under socialised view of 
markets where actors (clients and suppliers) are anonymous in nature (Mol 2007) to the other extreme 
characterised by social mechanisms of a networked society, lies the overlap of both economic and non-economic 
governance modes called relational governance.  
RG relies on a governance mode that is based upon cooperation, where suppliers and clients define mutual 
responsibilities and expectations from both parties and consequentially make joint plans to recognise future 
contingencies in the relationship (Claro et al. 2003). Claro lays out three levels of regulation – transaction, 
business and dyadic – which influence the success of RG (Claro et al. 2003). Transaction level is based on self-
enforcing agreements, where supplier and client are together accountable for transaction-specific investments and 
tailor processes to particular exchange partners. Business level consists of the business environment, such as 
information support obtained from the business networks and market volatility. Dyadic level captures confidence 
and belief in each other leading to inter-organisational and inter-personal trust between both parties during the 
course of the relationship. This trust allows organisations to confidently transact without the need for a complex 
safeguard mechanism.  Hurley also views trust as a relational concept and says trust is a measure of the quality of 
a relationship between two parties, as “when people choose to trust, they have gone through a decision-making 
process – one involving factors that can be identified, analysed, and influenced” (Hurley 2006, p. 56).  
Consistent with the transaction and business levels, a precursor to building trust and commitment in the 
outsourcing deal involves a formal contract between business partners to explicitly spell out costs, deadlines and 
penalties for any overruns or inconsistencies in the exchange. Specifically, a service level agreement is negotiated 
between both parties which lays out the ground rules for governance and structure to guide the interaction 
between both parties (Dibbern et al. 2008; Goo and Huang 2008). The dyadic level focuses on voluntary 
transactions between individuals involved in the transfer of resources, that are not purely economic, but address 
the behavioural and social side of the exchange (Qi and Chau 2012). Tactics are adopted to build less formal 
relationships by strengthening inter-personal and inter-organisational trust based on social interactions. This often 
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involves social costs, such as employment of agents by both suppliers and clients, who work towards alignment 
of common goals and expectations. These agents or boundary gate keepers broaden the socio-technical 
interactions and provide a platform in which communication channels are opened informally across cultural and 
technological levels to address shared concerns and for mitigating each other’s perceptions of risks 
SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS 
An SLA is a formal written agreement added as an addendum to a formal contract to provide product-specific 
terms and conditions, which addresses risk and trust issues in relational exchanges (Goo and Huang 2008). Once 
negotiations have been finalised between the supplier and client to arrive at an outsourcing deal, SLAs are 
devised by lawyers on obligations and rules for further action in the relationship. SLAs provide a formal control 
mechanism to ensure products and services are delivered, and to safeguard the time and money invested in the 
business transaction. Goo and Huang (2008) have identified three contractual characteristics to cultivate trust and 
relationship commitment, which are key attributes of relational governance. They are: (1) foundation 
characteristics which set clear standards of conduct by defining what clients and suppliers are obligated to deliver 
and at what cost, (2) governance characteristics which set clear statement of assessing the services through 
measurements, communication channels, conflict arbitration, penalty and rewards, and (3) change management 
characteristics which address how uncertainties will be handled in the changing IT environment.  
Further, offshore contracts are typically of two types – fixed price (FP) and time and material (T&M) – with 
differing risk implications for offshore clients and suppliers. FP contracts include a fixed fee for the software 
negotiated before the start of the project, where the supplier bears major part of the risk. While in a T&M 
contract, the supplier contracts out services at a certain rate and the client is responsible for monitoring progress 
on the project (Gopal and Sivaramkrishnan 2008). However, with the constant re-definition in project design, its 
growing complexity and the uncertainty in business environments, project tasks often require more time, thereby 
incurring more costs for the clients, since the client bears the cost of overruns (Abdullah and Verner 2012). 
Accordingly, SLAs are structured between the parties to better manage service expectations and ensure 
relationships remain on course. SLAs contain details of services to be provided, metrics to measure performance 
and adherence to delivery schedules, and can also include penalty and bonus clauses for under- or over- 
performances (Beaumont 2006; Currie et al. 2008).  Having a mutually negotiated agreement helps both sides to 
identify possible risks and reiterate their obligations to comply with the directives as have been laid down in the 
document. The risks posed could be related to intellectual property, confidentiality risks, compliance and 
regulatory, operational, reputation, geopolitical and any combination of these (Abdullah and Verner 2012; Currie 
et al. 2008). SLAs lay out the contractual and relational governance mechanisms, whereby they complement and 
substitute each other in different processing contexts of the relationship (Huber et al. 2014). That is, when faced 
with ambiguity, supplier and clients enforce formal control through the contractual clauses which substitute 
relational interactions, while in other informal situations both parties use hybrid adaptations of substitution and 
control. SLAs therefore, safeguard institutional risks to enable both partners gain each other’s trust and 
confidence in the outsourcing process. 
BOUNDARY GATE KEEPERS 
IT professionals have been seen as lacking credibility, not in expertise but in relationship building (Bashein and 
Markus 1997).  Suppliers are now adding relationship management and customer advocacy to their portfolio of 
skills as they deliver customer-intimate enterprise solutions for offshore clients (Moore and Martorelli 2004). 
These initiatives refer to definition of relationship strategies for build-up of trust and goodwill based upon the 
socio-cultural perceptions developed during ongoing interactions with diverse offshore groups.  The 
interdependence of both parties on each other, with different perceptions of each other’s cultural and societal 
structures further contributes to a feeling of vulnerability in ICT enabled communication. Pauleen and Yoong 
(2001) note that facilitators’ play an important role in ICT enabled communication, such as offshore 
environments, which are spread across inter-organisational and cross-cultural boundaries. Facilitators identify 
effective strategies for communication channels to include both computer mediated processes and face-to-face 
meetings. Further, they translate their business partners’ service requests into specific employee strategies by 
setting out clear roles, responsibilities and levels of authority, governance and management, thereby identifying 
and resolving risks before they threaten contractual agreements (Abdullah and Verner 2012).  
Inter-organisational and inter-personal trust have a “highly situational context”, and IT enabled relationships are 
different to human relationships (Jarvenpaa et al. 2004).   While inter-organisational trust reflects the extent to 
which members of an organisation collectively trust the partner firm, the inter-personal trust reflects the extent to 
which facilitators (or boundary gate keepers) are committed to each other for joint planning and problem solving  
(Claro et al. 2003). Hence relational governance deals with both higher level (collective or inter-organisational) 
and lower level (individual or inter-personal) trust conditions. Claro adds that under inter-organisational trust 
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conditions, partner firms rely less on elaborate safeguards for monitoring and enforcing agreements than in inter-
personal trust conditions; however, in inter-personal conditions, both boundary gate keepers jointly cope with 
problems faced in the course of the business engagement. The gate keepers understand the coding schemes on 
both sides of the organisational periphery (Choo 2006), and help develop effective boundary crossing behaviours 
to reduce misinterpretation of messages caused due to cultural programming of its members (Pauleen and Yoong 
2001). 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
Case studies are common research strategies for exploratory, explanatory and descriptive studies in social science 
research (Yin 2003). Exploratory case studies are used for theory building, explanatory case studies help in theory 
testing, while descriptive case studies present a complete description of the case (e.g., individual, organisation) 
within its study context (Yin 2003). In this study, descriptive case studies have been used to present an offshore 
business relationship, with narrative storylines of study participants (i.e., boundary gate keepers) to address 
preferred governance practices during the course of the relationship. Accordingly, three organisations were 
selected for this study. Selection of cases needs to be specific and deliberate (Eisenhardt 1989) so as to maximise 
what can be learned in the period of study time available (Dube and Pare 2003).  The three organisations were 
intentionally sought based on their industry type and offshore business characteristics, namely business 
partnerships. All three organisations have been represented by pseudonyms for anonymity reasons. Two of these 
are New Zealand client organisations (NZ-A and NZ-B) and the third is an Indian supplier (IND-SUP).  
Currently, the three firms are not in any business partnership, though previously both NZ-A and NZ-B had 
outsourced IT business activities to IND-SUP. However, they have each parted professionally and both the client-
supplier pairs are amicable with each other.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with relationship managers (or boundary gate keepers) in all of the 
three IT firms. Specifically, questions were asked to probe the governance mode with past and current offshore 
client / supplier.  We asked:   
Q1. What challenges are encountered in knowledge exchange with offshore partners? Why?  
Q2. Do SLAs play an important role in defining commitments and mitigating risks? How?  
Q3. What role do boundary gate keepers play in ensuring that business remains on track?  
Q4. What is the preferred governance mode in outsourced business partnerships? 
CASE DESCRIPTION  
The three participating organisations in this study are well recognised IT firms locally and internationally.  A 
brief description of each case is given next. This is followed by an overview of their previous outsourcing 
business arrangement 
Case 1: IND-SUP 
IND-SUP is a medium sized Indian IT service provider with approximately 170 employees. Their main 
development centre is in Vizag, India, though they have opened smaller offshore development centres in 
Auckland, Melbourne and Dallas. IND-SUP has earned many export performance awards from the Indian 
government. They presently have an offshore presence comprising 20 IT developers in Auckland headed by a 
manager, designated as Vice President (NZ – Operations). The IT developers are brought on a continuous basis 
on work permits from India to New Zealand, and are replaced by other Indian programmers when their work 
permits expire. The vice president (VP) facilitates the relationship with all New Zealand clients, and is the point 
of contact for any concern or issue raised by clients. 
Case 2: NZ-A 
NZ-A is a leading provider of solutions to primary healthcare professionals in New Zealand since 1980. They 
have opened another division in Australia, and have offices in Auckland, Melbourne, Sydney and Perth. NZ-A 
have approximately 16,000 users belonging to various medical health sectors within Australasia. The capabilities 
of NZ-A include sophisticated connectivity to government and third-party organisations such as laboratories and 
claims offices, robust networks for information exchange and communications, health assessment and 
management tools, and geo-coding for demographic information, amongst others. In 2007, NZ-A have started 
outsourcing IT work to an offshore development centre in Chennai, India, in which they have 10% ownership 
stake. However, previously they had engaged IND-SUP as their supplier. The general manager (GM) along with 
project leaders interact with the development teams located in India. 
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Case 3: NZ-B 
NZ-B has been a global leader in telecommunication technology applications since 2000, and they have their 
main development centre in Auckland. NZ-B has sales and operations offices in New York, Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Hyderabad. NZ-B offers world class interactive mobile marketing solutions 
and provides connectivity between people and brands, and has won several major mobile and marketing awards 
worldwide. The company creates, executes and analyses long term interactive mobile strategies for brands and 
agencies, and has a vast international clientele and partnerships with many service providers for deployment of 
their mobile applications. NZ-B had previously experienced offshore dealings with IND-SUP, which made them 
better realise the governance aspects in the management of IT outsourcing arrangements. In 2005, they opened an 
offshore software development centre in Hyderabad, India, to work on client projects jointly with their 
development centre in Auckland. This joint venture with a new supplier is partially owned by NZ-B, offering 
more cost benefits. Project leaders (PL) interact with the supplier teams located in India. 
Outsourcing Arrangement: 
As has been stated, the three firms were earlier involved in an offshore business partnership, which has been 
terminated.  Figure 1 describes their outsourcing arrangement in earlier and current settings.  In earlier settings, 
the three boundary gate keepers of the three firms, namely general manager (GM) of NZ-A, project leader (PL) of 
NZ-B, and vice president (VP) of IND-SUP had been the first point of contact in the communication channels 
spanning the offshore client-supplier settings. These individuals played a dominant role in fostering trust by 
maintaining each other’s expectations and ensuring that SLA obligations are met by their organisation members. 
In new settings, NZ-A and NZ-B have opened joint ventures with new business partners and have ownership 
stakes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Outsourcing arrangement of earlier and current settings 
CASE FINDINGS  
This section draws upon case study data to offer insights on the relational governance strategies adopted across 
client-supplier boundaries. In analysing the cases, we present descriptive data from interviews, so that the reader 
is led to a better understanding of the experience under study (Janesick 2003). Janesick advises researchers to use 
abundant sections transcripts, as qualitative work is grounded from data; the words of the participants; field notes, 
reflective journal entries and other written records. The responses to questions from the three firms are 
synthesised next. 
Q1. What challenges are encountered in knowledge exchanges with offshore partners? Why?  
The three organisations emphasised that outsourcing arrangements involving knowledge transfer to offshore firms 
is not without associated challenges. The challenges are not about social or cultural differences; rather it is the 
operational aspects related to knowledge specialists and the nature of the outsourced work that matters more. One 
client (NZ-B) said challenges were mostly at start of the partnership, when requirements were to be conveyed and 
understood across both sides. “How well, the offshore side has understood what we want. Though our work 
is rather routine, our risks were more at the start when the work content was not clear.  But once, they 
[offshore supplier] know what we want, then it is no big deal” (PL). Another client (NZ-A) said they were 
cautious of sending too much details of their business application domain to the offshore supplier due to the 
sensitive nature of their IT work in medical services.  
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The confidentiality and security concerns of customers’ medical records, government agencies and third party 
groups (laboratories, claim offices) meant that non-core tasks could only be outsourced, without delving too much 
in the business domain.  Further, “the deal was that they [offshore supplier] would not work for anyone else, so 
they have dedicated a part of their resource for us alone. These developers cannot work on any other project 
except ours”. Hence, a deed of non-disclosure has been signed with offshore partner, to protect the proprietary 
and commercial information of NZ-A. Furthermore, event logs are monitored to check if any unauthorised access 
has been made in the knowledge exchange. 
The supplier (IND-SUP) considered requirement gathering as the main challenge. “If requirements are not clear 
or incomplete, you could go tangentially wrong”. This could result in missed deadlines. Therefore, freezing of 
core requirements is essential to mitigate risks. The VP stated that non-core requirements are refined and they 
regularly change in the course of the project progress, but these changes are jointly discussed “across the table” 
and documented. IND-SUP has 20 IT developers located at Auckland near the client sites, to enable a direct 
discussion on client requirements. The VP added that IT staff turnover is another risk. When skilled people leave 
jobs, new team members have to be trained in the specifics of client projects. Hence, documentation is used to 
reduce the risks from staff turnover, with project tasks explicitly laid over ICT portals. With this arrangement, 
project tasks are easily transferred to new team members in the event of any person leaving employment. Further, 
documentation also brings both Vizag and Auckland IT teams on a common knowledge platform to realise the 
client project specifications. 
Q2. Do SLAs play an important role in defining commitments and mitigating risks? How?  
All firms agreed that SLAs are essential to providing security in exchange of services in an outsourcing 
partnership, and each one of them have entered into formal contracts with offshore partners. One client firm (NZ-
A) has only fixed contracts with their offshore suppliers, while the other client firm (NZ-B) has entered mostly in 
time and material contracts, though they have some fixed contracts as well. The supplier (IND-SUP) has entered 
in both fixed and time and material contracts with offshore clients. The supplier added that many client firms 
structure SLAs with late delivery penalty clauses for managing overruns in project schedules. Further, IND-SUP 
was penalised once in a situation where a developer located at the client’s site in Auckland made some last 
minute changes with the client. This change had not been documented in the portal and hence could not be shared 
with the main development team in Vizag (India), resulting in a major issue. Ever since, explicit documentation 
of scope changes is emphasised with use of automated tools (e.g., Bynet) to manage the project schedule, which 
ensures decisions are communicated explicitly between both Vizag and Auckland teams.  
IT work is a flexible and incremental activity in which software builds are continually modified at various 
intermediate development stages by both clients and supplier teams. The three cases stated that SLAs are crucial 
for offshore partnerships, where commercial obligations of “buy and sell” need to be clearly stated. Both parties 
are bound by the legal clauses of the SLA, and “handover” and expectations must be clearly defined. This 
reduces risks for both parties, since they can plan ahead and negotiate in case they foresee any misalignment in 
services. “We should both be allowed to change our minds during the evolving phase between builds, but 
not after a sign off”. 
Q3. What role do boundary gate keepers play in ensuring that business remains on track? 
The supplier (IND-SUP) reiterated the situation when their firm was penalised heavily for project overruns in an 
offshore project. Since then, IND-SUP has recognised the key role played by the gate keepers. Accordingly, IND-
SUP has placed a relationship manager (or boundary gate keeper) at each client location (i.e., Dallas, Melbourne 
and Auckland) to coordinate project activities. At each of these locations, IND-SUP has a local office in an up-
market commercial area, where meetings are held daily in the evenings after 5 pm with developers. The team 
located in Vizag also joins these meetings using ICT synchronous tools where documents are posted on the Web 
portals and discussed in detail. The Vizag team is seven hours behind their New Zealand counterparts; therefore 
working days at Auckland site are extended almost daily to 10 pm.  
The client NZ-A commented: “key is communication with face-to-face contact, as people need to interact to 
form good relationships”. Further, having a gate keeper means that cost estimations are made, and “buffers can 
be identified to smoothen out differences”. They currently have a relationship manager, who frequently visits 
the offshore centre in Chennai, India, and ensures work commitments are met across both sides. However, client 
NZ-B noted that relationship managers are essential at the start of the relationship, but once the tasks are 
streamlined, then human intervention is not needed anymore. NZ-B explained that in their recent joint venture 
partnership with offshore team, the project leaders interact with offshore development team over ICT tools. 
Earlier, when NZ-B and IND-SUP were partners, the role of boundary gate keepers was used to manage work 
flows, but in the current arrangement, they no longer feel the need to do so. “The project team knows best what 
they want, and they communicate directly”.  However, the PLs added that the staff turnover at the Indian 
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development centre often created many issues in knowledge transfer. This is because during the course of the 
project, the developer at the supplier end would be different time and again. So, PLs had to deal with new people 
every time, and this led to repeated explanations of their requirements “again and again”. 
Q4. What is the preferred governance mode in outsourced business partnerships? 
With regard to their preferred governance mode, all cases cited the importance of building cordial relationships, 
especially for IT (or knowledge) work. Both client firms (NZ-A and NZ-B) stated that their previous partnership 
experience with an offshore supplier (IND-SUP) had been quite revealing. They have realised the importance of 
detail in breakdown of project tasks for outsourcing arrangements. Further, once they had information about how 
work commitments are managed, they gathered confidence to enter into joint ventures with offshore IT firms, 
where they are currently in a profit sharing partnership. Hence, joint ventures are considered more commercially 
viable. It was also suggested that governance mode will build trust and confidence, only if risks and profits are 
shared. Both partners need to be involved in the exchange of services. With joint ventures, the partners had more 
control on knowledge flows and work allocations. Client firms can thus extend their span of control to supplier 
networks. However, these clients still contract out work to suppliers even though these suppliers are joint venture 
partners, and have drafted SLAs for managing project service and delivery.  
The supplier (IND-SUP) has many clients in New Zealand, spanning large tertiary institutions to small 
businesses. The relationship manager (VP) visits the clients weekly and follows up project activities with 
development teams at both, Auckland and Vizag on a daily basis. Though, IND-SUP has lost two clients, the 
company is optimistic in outsourcing business. Further, being recognised internationally with CMM and ISO 
9001 quality certifications, they have a good reputation in overseas markets. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The study investigates two client-supplier partnerships to give a detailed perspective of practitioners’ perspectives 
in mitigating outsourcing risks. Gold states, it is the relationship at the operational level, rather than executive 
level, which determines how ICT tools will support the knowledge integration mechanisms across inter-
organisational settings in offshore environments (Gold 2005). The main contribution of this research is that, 
compared to earlier studies, it provides a deeper understanding on how the operational and social aspects of 
knowledge exchange are governed. The insightful empirical findings of three real-life cases engaged in offshore 
partnerships identify factors that impact relational governance practices at the operational and social levels. 
Offshore contracting of IT knowledge is actively pursued by clients and suppliers in different outsourcing 
arrangements.  These outsourcing arrangements are directed by formal contracts and social networks. Though 
offshore business partners, share a cordial social relationship, the study offers new insights on the use of formal 
contracts, which are underlined with careful drafting of legal clauses. These clauses are used for safeguarding 
proprietary strategic assets, such as commercial sensitive information of the business domain. Also, penalty 
clauses are implemented if services are not conducted satisfactorily. Boundary gate keepers keep track of the 
contractual obligations as laid out in service level agreements at the operational level. IT work is characterised by 
high-pressure environments in which knowledge is developed within tight schedules for meeting deadlines. 
Hence, IT developers often make or break decisions with new task requirements as project knowledge evolves. 
Organisations can sense uncertainty in meeting their commercial obligations, hence weekly face-to-face meetings 
and daily interactions over ICT tools (e.g., Web portals) are used to monitor project progress. But if a project is 
considered low risk with routine IT features, boundary gate keepers are not required for maintaining social 
networks.  Work is then carried out directly by the partner teams. However, with employee turnover, when team 
members are replaced by new members, this causes some frustration. In such situations, boundary gate keepers 
play a more crucial role, as they mediate and hide the volatility at offshore partner’s end. 
The challenges voiced by study participants include incomplete documentation in portals, project over-runs due to 
changing requirements, staff turnover at development centres involved in IT work, and maintaining 
confidentiality of project tasks. Hence, governance structures adopted are based upon open and frequent 
communication. Boundary gate keepers are employed to streamline tasks for specific projects, but not for routine 
IT projects.  
Both suppliers and clients learn the process of knowledge transfer, which could be applied for identifying new 
business opportunities. This study describes the formation of two new business partnerships with profit sharing 
incentives. This finding reflects how IT outsourcing markets are growing despite the perceived risks. Practice 
knowledge on contracts, boundary gate keepers and usage of ICT tools are shared.  
Through an extant literature review on client-supplier relationships in outsourcing arrangements, Lyons and 
Brenan (2014) identify studies which state that the dependence between the client and supplier deepens as they 
establish shared values and governance structures, and this may lead to joint investments. However, our study 
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found that shared values and positive governance structures between a client and supplier influenced the start of a 
new joint investment. Once clients felt that they had attained maturity in management of the relational aspects in 
a partnership, they were confident in entering a new joint ownership venture. Our real world example shows that 
successful implementation of relational governance structures could curtail a long-term business partnership. Put 
differently, relational strategy is based upon deploying governance mechanisms for mutual knowledge sharing 
and learning between business partners. However, when knowledge transfer is successful, the firms may gain 
enough confidence to consider managing knowledge and conduct of business themselves through backward 
integration. The firms may no longer feel the need for their partner, resulting in the termination of the 
relationship, as the firms increase their span of control with separate ownership partnerships. As has been 
demonstrated in this study, a previous supply chain was disrupted, and new profit sharing and ownership deals 
were executed with new joint venture partnerships. A good relational strategy may not guarantee long term 
business partnerships, since the elements of transaction economics cannot be ignored in outsourcing 
arrangements. 
Based on the case findings, the study demonstrates how relational governance is influenced by overlap of 
knowledge processes, social networks and market profits. Boundary gate keepers design social networks for 
enabling smooth knowledge processes in managing inter-organisational transaction costs. However, this may not 
suffice in maintaining long term partnerships, since the outsourcing arrangement is influenced by external 
influences of the economic and social markets. Knowledge markets are growing as partner firms strategize to 
better implement global operations and increase overall profits. Joint ventures are one way forward to manage 
relationships during knowledge exchange in terms of reducing costs, managing project tasks, overcoming 
confidentiality concerns and achieving service delivery. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The retrospective nature of client-supplier partnership is a limitation of this research study. However, 
retrospection adds to experience, and to practice perspectives which are made in hindsight, therefore has a 
positive influence in this study. The hindsight from client perspectives has revealed the relatively less importance 
of agents (or boundary gate keepers) in later parts of the relationship. The supplier perspectives also revealed that 
outsourcing partnerships are fragile, which need careful planning and monitoring at the operational level. The 
empirical investigation shows that relational exchange shares a complex inter-relation with economic exchange. 
Our study shows that tactics which were applied for supporting and bringing transparency in a relational 
exchange with external partners eventually curtailed the partnership, and resulted in the formation of a new 
internal partnership based on economic gain. Once relational governance structures are captured in organisational 
settings, they can be reused by the organisation in a more profitable manner with other partnering firms through 
joint ventures. 
The study has shown external market influences on relational governance strategies for two client-supplier 
relationships. Questions have been raised on the impact of transaction, business and dyadic levels on long-term 
relationships, as these levels complement and contradict various elements in a relational partnership exchange. 
Knowledge firms are driven by all of the three levels in which “buy or make” decisions are driven by their 
business capabilities and ongoing social exchanges, which may result in integrating partner’s activities into their 
firms. Business sensitivity of outsourcing contracts between clients and suppliers restrict studies in providing a 
detailed practitioner view on the reasons for relational governance strategies adopted by them. However, further 
research may be conducted in understanding details of governance strategies for other outsourcing relationships. 
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